The paradox of Georgia’s European integration
Writer, George Milne, explores implications of the recent Georgian elections for Georgia’s candidacy for the EU.
Image Credit: kgbbristol
Despite the fact the South Caucasian country of Georgia is still only a candidate for European Union membership, one could be easily forgiven for mistaking it as one of the Union’s core members upon a visit to the country. EU flags are everywhere in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, adorning streets and government buildings in a manner that would put most EU member states to shame. Politicians are rarely seen speaking without an EU flag somewhere in the background, and the EU flag frequently features on the logos of political parties. But despite this, following Georgia’s recent parliamentary elections in October, the country seems as far from realising this fervent ambition as it has for years.
Accession to the EU has long been one of the cornerstones of Georgian politics, acquiring a sense of inevitability as the country sees itself not only as a core European state, but as the birthplace of European civilisation. As of 2023, 79% of Georgians still share a commitment to joining the EU, which represents to many a chance to break away from the Soviet past that entailed decades of isolation from Europe and the denial of its core economic freedoms (NDI). This westward turn has come at the expense of their relations with their northern neighbour, Russia, whose disapproval of this manifested in their military intervention against Georgia in 2008. The Russians upheld the secessionist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia inside Georgia’s internationally recognised borders, where their troops remain stationed to this day.
Given all this, the success of the Georgian Dream, the country’s ruling party since 2012, seems paradoxical. The party, de facto run by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, has managed to win elections on the basis of European integration, but simultaneously deepened ties with Russia and enacted policies that contradict their purported European aspirations.
A new law requiring NGOs who receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as “pursuing the interests of a foreign power” sparked bitter protests and saw Georgia’s EU bid frozen, with Brussels accusing the government of “democratic backsliding”. Due to its striking similarity to a 2012 law restricting foreign press in Russia, the law became known as the “Russian law” among protestors, and the EU flag became a symbol of resistance to it. Georgian Dream has also intensified the country’s mistreatment of the LGBT+ community, banning same-sex marriage and the depiction of LGBT+ people in the media this year, a move which drew similar condemnation from the EU. Recently Ivanishvili promised to make the opposition “answer with the full rigour of the law for the war crimes committed against the population of Georgia”, threatening to ban several parties without elaborating on the war crimes in question. However, given the impossibility of electoral success on an anti-EU premise in Georgia, Georgian Dream has continued to present themselves as the party of European integration despite their actions to the contrary.
In light of this, the nationwide parliamentary elections on 26 October were portrayed in European media as an existential referendum on the country’s European future. The opposition coalition presented Georgian Dream as a Russia-controlled puppet organisation determined to block Georgia’s path into the EU and reintegrate with their former Soviet partner. They particularly emphasised the disparity between Georgian Dream’s insistence on EU integration and its repeated actions that directly prevent such an integration. Georgian Dream has invested heavily in adverts depicting ruined Ukrainian cities alongside pictures highlighting Georgia’s development, underlined by the slogan “Say no to war – choose peace”, with the distorted logos of the opposition on the side depicting Ukraine. The party claims that the opposition’s reckless pro-European and liberal policies will drag Georgia back into war with Russia and promises a more peaceful European integration on their terms.
Given the stakes at play, the day of the elections itself, 26 October, unfolded in as tumultuous and polarised a manner as the build-up to the elections threatened. Multiple incidents of voter intimidation and ballot stuffing were reported, as well as violence against election officials by gangs whom the opposition accuses Georgian Dream of sending. The Georgian NGO We Vote claimed that, from 1131 polling stations, they received reports of violations of electoral procedures from more than 900. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported on a “climate of hatred and intimidation” that had arisen from the Georgian Dream’s use of “Russian disinformation, manipulation and conspiracy theories.”, but did not say the election had been rigged outright.
At voting’s close, both the opposition and the government declared victory, with news outlets on both sides providing significantly different figures to support their claims. The Georgian Central Election Commission gave Georgian Dream 54% of the vote, surpassing the 50% threshold for a parliamentary majority but falling short of the larger majority they would need to carry out their threat to ban the opposition. The president of Georgia, Salome Zourabichvili, whose role is mostly ceremonial and has little impact on policy, was quick to condemn the results as a “total falsification” and a “Russian special operation”. She pleaded for the West to apply “extreme pressure” to the incumbent Georgian government and called for the Georgian people to take to the streets in protest, a call heeded by 20,000 Georgians two days after the election. Protests continued for the following week, but little has changed since.
Built up to be the be-all and end-all of the fight for Georgia’s European future, this election has only heightened the country’s political contradictions. Since the elections, Georgian Dream has continued to insist that “European Integration is the key foreign policy priority of Georgia”, despite accusations from Brussels that, under its rule, “Georgia has gone backwards”. They have simultaneously asserted that there is “No space for diplomatic relations” with Russia while they occupy South Ossetia and Abkhazia, despite Russia’s alleged interference on their behalf in the election. Amidst allegations from the EU of “democratic backsliding”, they chose to welcome Hungarian president Viktor Orban as their first visitor following the elections, whose rule the European Parliament has denounced as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy”.
The recent elections provide more questions than they do answers. Allegations of electoral fraud have only further diverted Georgia from their Western trajectory, but Georgian Dream have paradoxically claimed that their contested victory is somehow a win for the country’s European ambitions. The Georgian Dream has persisted in trying to reconcile these contradictory realities with the assertion that Georgia will undoubtedly join the EU, just on its own terms. What these terms are, however, remains to be seen.
Words by George Milne
